Conflict Early Warning at ISA 2008

“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” I am at the 2008 International Studies Association (ISA) convention in San Francisco, California. On Tuesday, I presented a paper on “The Application of Geophysics for Conflict Analysis” at a day-long workshop on Complexity science and International Relations. On Saturday, I present a second paper on “Upgrading the Role of ICT in Early Warning and Response” at a panel organized by USIP. What worries me is what happened in the middle.

On Thursday I attended a panel on conflict early warning systems in Africa. I looked forward to this panel with great interest given that my professional and academic background originates in the field of conflict early warning. Much to my chagrin, however, nothing has changed. The Ivory Tower is still dominating the development of Africa’s conflict early warning systems. Following the presentations on the African Union’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Chair opened the floor to questions from the audience. Note that most of the panelists were practitioners working directly on these systems.

When I asked what their indicators of success for CEWS was, the answer confirmed my worst fears: regular, high-quality early warning reports. “So not operational response, then?” I asked. “No,” the panelist confirmed. Nothing has changed. Despite years of so-called “lessons learned and best practices,” successful conflict early warning is still measured in number of reports, not in the number of lives saved . An academic on the panel suggested the following four indicators of success for any early warning system: Description (of trends), Explanation (of trends), Formulation (of policy recommendations) and Action. Academics excel at the first three. And because academics are always the consultants who develop conflict early warning systems, these systems are no more than glorified databases.

The same panelist then cited the (outdated) refrain that successful prevention can not be proven. And yet this same person has published the very opposite (in peer reviewed literature no less) thus fully contradicting himself. Rather ironic that an academic would make a statement of the type “X cannot be proven” and still pursue the same research for ten years. The very foundation of scientific thought is built on Karl Popper’s principle of falsification. A theory that is not falsifiable is simply unscientific.

If successful conflict prevention cannot be proven, then how will we ever know whether conflict early warning systems have any impact whatsoever? On the other hand, this may be an advantage. By repeatedly stating that successful prevention cannot be proven, we infer that unsuccessful prevention can not be proven either. That way we can continue asking donors for funding without having to demonstrate any impact beyond a few reports every year. In addition, we can conveniently dismiss anyone (like myself) who might have the nerve to suggest that an indicator of success for conflict prevention should be number of lives saved.

Patrick Philippe Meier